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Abstract. Using household-level data from Indonesia, we investigate the
importance of community characteristics: ethnic diversity and central gov-
ernment transfers, inter alia, in determining monetary and time contributions
to community organizations. We present a framework in which ethnic diver-
sity affects contributions through three channels: (1) diversity of preferences
(2) transaction costs, and (3) inter-household considerations in the form of
altruism towards one’s ethnic group. Our empirical findings provide evidence
that ethnic diversity has a negative and significant effect on contributions, and
the prevalence of community organizations. We find evidence that government
spending crowds out private monetary contributions, with a less robust effect
on time contributions.
JEL classification: O12, H41, J16, Z13
Key words: Ethnic diversity, contributions, transfers, community organiza-
tions
1. Introduction
Community organizations can play a central role in the development process.
Where markets and states face limitations, community-based institutions
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provide public goods and services, organize economic production, and
redistribute income. Although there is a great deal of interest in the
determinants of collective action in developing countries, very little is known
about the transfer of resources from households to community-based
institutions. In this paper, we investigate monetary and time contributions
to community organizations using household-level data from Indonesia.
This paper aims to advance existing knowledge on private transfer flows to
community organizations in developing countries. Within heterogeneous
societies, community characteristics including ethnic diversity can affect con-
tributions to community organizations.We investigate three potential channels
through which ethnic diversity can affect monetary and time contributions.1
The first channel can be summarized as the ‘‘diverse preferences’’ argument
(Alesina et al. 1999). Itmaybedifficult to defineobjectives towards the financing
of local public goods where the community members have diverse preferences
due to ethnic diversity and other forms of heterogeneity. Second, ethnic
diversity may increase the transaction costs of community-level production.
If trust, social sanctions, and reciprocity norms are cultivated at the group
level, these are less likely to be effective in diverse environments (Miguel 2001).
Ethnic diversity may also be related to the absence of social cohesion and,
in some extreme cases, civil violence, which may hinder efforts to organize
contributions at the community-level. Finally, ethnic diversity can affect
contributions if households belonging to the same ethnic community are
altruistically-linked (Becker 1981; Grimard 1997; Luttmer 2001).
We also study the impact of government expenditure on private transfers
to community-level institutions. There is very limited evidence on the rela-
tionship between government transfers and private resource flows in devel-
oping countries, as previous studies rely on data obtained mainly from
developed countries2 (See Clotfelter 1985; Kingma 1989; Weisbrod 1988). The
developing country setting used in this paper offers a unique opportunity to
study the role of government spending in an environment where public
transfers tend to be limited in scope, and where few tax-related incentives for
transfer behavior exist.
The main empirical findings from Indonesia provide support for an
exchange-based model of community transfers. Households transfer resources
in a manner that reflects the benefits they receive from the community orga-
nization. We find that ethnic diversity has a negative effect on both monetary
and time contributions, as well as on the prevalence of community-based
organizations. In addition, we explore potential mechanisms through which
ethnic diversity influences contributions. Results on government spending
yield important insights. Government transfers appear to crowd-out private
monetary contributions, with less convincing evidence on time contributions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a
description of the setting. In Sect. 3, we present the conceptual framework.
Section 4 discusses the data sources. Section 5 outlines the empirical frame-
work. In Sects. 6 and 7, we present the results and conclusions.
2. The setting: Community organizations in Indonesia
Indonesia’s national motto, ‘‘Unity in Diversity,’’ makes reference to its
heterogeneous linguistic and ethnic composition. The country’s official
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language is Bahasa Indonesia. However, more than 668 other languages and
dialects are also spoken. The major languages spoken often belong to distinct
ethnic groups. These ethno-linguistic groups include the Javanese (45% of the
population), Sundanese (14%), Madurese (7.5%), coastal Malays (7.5%),
others (26%).
An early observer notes the importance of ethnicity in the Indonesian
context: ‘‘Regardless of the political settlement effected in Indonesia in the
near future, the social and ethnic differences of its population will continue to
constitute a major problem in the political and economic development of the
area’’ (Van Der Kroef 1950:450). Until recently, rates of regional migration in
Indonesia were relatively low (Hugo 1982). Geographical barriers make
transportation between regions very difficult. In addition, land markets are
not well-developed in many areas. Since the early 1990s, however, there has
been a rising trend in mobility.3 Investments in road networks and other
transport infrastructure have improved the ease of movement across regions.
Consequently, ethnic groups with distinct languages, customs, and traditions
(adat) have moved towards greater economic and social interaction.
During the Suharto regime (1965–1998), Indonesia was centrally gov-
erned, with regional and local governments wielding very little political
autonomy. Central government involvement in communities also grew during
this period with nearly 80% of total public expenditure at the provincial level
being disbursed by the central government. The remaining 20% of local public
expenditure was made up of grants (INPRES Desa or Village development
program) from the Central government for development projects including
roads, irrigation, schools, and public health, and less than 10% of regional
government expenditure was derived from local taxes and fees (Booth 1996).
Official government literature during this period emphasizes gotong royong, or
community participation as a central part of a national development strategy
(Bowen 1986). Communities, in turn, were expected to provide volunteer
labor, building materials, and money for use with central government trans-
fers. The centralized system of community organization allows us to study
patterns of contributions because organizations are comparable across
regions. In our data, households may contribute time, money, or materials to
an irrigation association (subuk), a neighborhood security arrangement, rice
cooperatives, and neighborhood health posts (posyandu)- all these groups can
be classified as community-level organizations. A notable example, posyandu
relies on salaried government staff and volunteer workers to deliver key health
services to the community (Frankenberg and Thomas 2001).
3. Conceptual framework
Economic theory provides a framework for understanding transfer patterns
at the community level. With altruism, households contribute money and
time to community organizations because they care about other members of
the community. Under the exchange motive, households transfer resources
because they benefit directly from their contributions and enjoy the goods and
services produced by community organizations. Our framework considers the
role of both motives in the household’s transfer decision. We assume that
households derive benefits from the services of community organizations and
may also care about the utility of others that use these services. We model
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services as local public goods whose production requires household contri-
butions and government transfers as inputs.
Within altruism and exchange-based considerations, community-level
variables, including ethnic diversity and government transfers, can influence
the household’s transfer decision. In this section, we present our conceptual
framework. The formal model is detailed in an appendix, which is available
upon request.
3.1. Ethnic diversity and contributions
Ethnic diversity can affect contributions to community organizations through
the diversity of preferences, transaction costs of organizing, and inter-
household considerations in the form of altruism towards one’s own ethnic
community. These mechanisms are presented below and suggest that ethnic
diversity can have a negative impact on contributions. It is important to
recognize that ethnic heterogeneity may also be positively associated with
contributions. Within ethnically diverse settings, community organizations
may provide public goods when governments and markets fail to satisfy the
heterogenous needs of consumers (Weisbrod 1988).4
Diverse preferences. Ethnic diversity may lead to a polarization of preferences
where a larger fraction of the community may find the type of services offered
by the community organization undesirable. This has a negative effect on the
probability of contributions and the level of monetary or time transfers to the
community organization when there is only one type of transfer under
consideration. If households jointly choose monetary and time transfers, then
the effect of diverse preferences is more complex. Specifically, if the marginal
utility of money and time contributions diminish ‘‘rapidly enough’’ to
compensate for any possible negative cross-utility effects of money and time
transfers, then we expect the probability and level of money and time
contributions to decrease with greater diversity in preferences. In our
empirical work, we use an indicator variable to measure whether a household
belongs to the majority ethnic group in a community or belongs to a minority
ethnic group (in a community where there is a majority ethnic group) to test
the diversity of preferences hypothesis.5 If the type of services provided are
based on majority preferences, a household from a non-majority group may
find them less desirable and will be less likely to contribute to their
production. We use this indicator variable (non-majority=1) as a measure of
a household’s preference distance from the services provided by the
community organization.
Transaction costs. Community-level production often depends on trust and
communication among groups. Ethnically diverse communities may have
low levels of trust and may lack community-level norms of reciprocity,
particularly if these attributes are cultivated within ethnic groups. With
high transaction costs in a community, the formation of community-level
organizations may be more difficult. Furthermore, it may be more costly to
produce services in the presence of communication barriers arising from
ethno-linguistic diversity. Thus, high transaction costs will have a negative
effect on organization existence and will decrease the probability of giving
when we only consider one type of transfer. If households jointly choose
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monetary and time transfers, then the effect of transaction costs on giving
is likely to be ambiguous and will depend on cross-utility effects of money
and time transfers as stated in the previous section. We test the transaction
costs hypothesis by constructing an index of ethno-linguistic diversity and
measuring its effect on the probability and level of monetary and time
transfers.
Inter-household considerations. Ethnic diversity may influence contributions
through altruistic preferences. The extent to which altruistic preferences lead
to variations in the level of support for community services depends on
differences across households in the correlation between the weight a
household (i) places on the utility of another household, (j), and the
marginal benefit of i0s contribution to j. The marginal benefit of i0s
contribution to household j is positive if j receives community services. In
particular, support for community services, and hence the level of contri-
butions is higher among individuals for whom this correlation is larger.6
Thus, ethnic diversity affects contributions if the weight that household i
places on the utility of household j is higher when j belongs to i0s ethnic
group. The prediction that emerges here is that household i will increase its
contributions as the number of similar households who benefit from the
services of the community organization rises. In this paper, we test the
altruism towards one’s own ethnic group hypothesis by investigating
the impact of the share of beneficiaries from a household’s ethnic group
on the probability and level of contributions.
Another channel that inter-household effects may affect the time transfer
decision is when households prefer to interact with others who belong to the
same ethnic or socio-economic group, as modelled by Alesina and LaFerrara
(2000). In their model, individuals derive disutility from interacting with
people who belong to a different ethnic group. For this reason, time
contributions may be particularly responsive to the share of participants in
the community organization who belong to one’s own ethnic group and the
household’s non-majority status in the community.
In this section, we have discussed the channels through which ethnic
diversity may affect contributions. We examine the relative importance
of these mechanisms using various ethnicity measures in the empirical section
of the paper. From the onset, we note that there is likely to be some degree of
correlation between our ethnicity variables, which may limit our ability to
fully differentiate between various mechanisms through which ethnic diversity
affects contributions.
3.2. Government expenditure and contributions
If households’ monetary (time) transfers and government expenditure are
substitutes in the production of community services, then government
support is likely to crowd out contributions. When household contributions
and government transfers are complementary, then the effect of government
expenditure on private contributions is ambiguous. Since time contributions
and government expenditure are likely to be complements while monetary
contributions and government expenditure may be substitutes, we expect
crowding-out issues to be less (more) relevant for time (monetary) transfers.
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We test the effect of government expenditure on contributions in our
empirical section.
4. Data
We test the implications of our model using data from Indonesia. The data
are based on the second wave of the Indonesia Family Life Surveys (IFLS2),
conducted by RAND in 1997/98, and are representative of about 83% of
Indonesia’s population.
The second wave is composed of about 7500 households. In addition, we
use a separate Community-Facility Survey, which measures infrastructure,
availability of services, and other community characteristics for about 314
communities where households reside.7 Table 1 provides an overview of the
household and community variables used in our analysis.
The IFLS2 data is particularly well-suited to the study of transfers to
community organizations. To our knowledge, there are no comparable data
sets (from developed or developing countries) that provide household-level
evidence on transfers to community organizations and benefits received from
a representative national sample of households. Community organizations in
our sample are largely economic in orientation. In this way, our focus differs
from other studies that have examined participation in social, religious, and
political groups.8
Over 40% of households contributed money or materials to a community
organization. The mean total monetary contribution in the survey year for
households is about 21150 rupiah, about 3% of total annual household
expenditure (standard deviation=93435 rupiah). Time contributions are
widespread in our sample - about 80% of households contributed time to an
organization in the community. It is important to note that surveys in
developed countries have found that households are more likely to contribute
money to community organizations (rather than time contributions, as we
have found). About 58% of households in our sample report that they re-
ceived benefits from community organizations.
The IFLS2 data allow us to investigate the extent to which giving and
receipt patterns vary across households. From the onset, it is important to
note that it may be difficult to measure all the benefits that households receive
from organizations in an accurate manner (Clotfelter 1992). Benefits may not
be tangible goods and services that can be observed by the researcher (such as
membership rights and a sense of belonging in the community) and may be
realized over a long-term horizon.
4.1. Ethnicity variables
Following our theoretical framework, we set out to examine the impact of
ethnicity on the household’s decision to contribute to the community
organization.9 To capture ethnic diversity at the community level, we




ðshare of ethnolinguistic group i in community kÞ2 ð4:1Þ
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The Ethno-linguistic Diversity index is constructed using household level
data. This index of ethnic diversity captures the probability that two ran-
domly selected households belong to different ethnic groups. This measure of
ethnic diversity has been used widely in the existing literature (Alesina et al
1999; Easterly and Levine 1997; Miguel 2001).
When this index is close to zero, it indicates that most households belong
to the same ethnic group. In contrast, when the index approaches 1, it means
that households in a given community belong to many different ethnic
groups. The ethnic diversity index is used in our analysis to measure the effect
of transactions costs of community-level production on contributions.10
We also include an indicator variable in our analysis which captures
whether a household belongs to a non-majority ethno-linguistic group in a
given community. Specifically, our indicator variable (non-majority or
minority status) is equal to 1 if household belongs to a minority ethno-
linguistic group, in a community where there is an ethnic group which con-
stitutes the majority of the population in village (i.e., an ethnic group that
accounts for more that fifty percent of the community’s population). This
non-majority status variable is used in our analysis to test the diverse pref-
erences hypothesis. Under the diverse preferences hypothesis, if community
organizations provide services that reflect the preferences of the median voter
who is from the majority group, then a household from a minority group will
find these services less desirable and will be less likely to contribute.
The share of beneficiaries from household i0s ethno-linguistic group is an
important variable in our analysis (SHARE). This variable allows us to test
whether inter-household considerations, in the form of altruism towards one’s
own ethnic group, are relevant in our environment. SHARE reflects the
distribution of benefits from community organizations in a given community,
and its value will vary across ethnic groups within the same community. This
variable is constructed as follows:
SHARE ¼ No: of households from household i
0s ethnic group with benefits
No: of households with benefits
ð4:2Þ
4.2. Other community variables
Community characteristics used in our analysis include government
involvement in the community, the density of community activities, and
village infrastructure. The measure of government involvement used in our
estimations is per capita transfers (measured in rupiah and scaled by 1000)
from the central government. This data are available at the municipality
(kabupaten) level and was obtained from the Village Government Financial
Statistics 1998, a report published by the Indonesian Central Bureau of
Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik or BPS).
The index of community activity is defined as the number of social
activities and services that exist in a village. This variable is constructed using
the Community-Facility Survey and is a weighted sum of activities conducted
in a community, where the weights are frequency with which activities are
conducted.11
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To account for regional variation, we construct province dummies, which
are used in our estimations. Province dummies reflect ethno-linguistic
variation and capture the level of urbanization, population density, as well
as other differences across regions.
4.3. Household variables
The existing literature on private transfers emphasizes the role of household
variables. We include variables that capture the socio-economic circum-
stances of the household, including age, years of schooling, marital status,
religion (Muslim=1), household size, number of children, per capita
household expenditure, and an indicator variable for receipt of benefits
(received benefits from community organization=1).
5. Empirical specification and methods
5.1. Contributions to community organizations
This section presents an empirical model of the household’s decision to
contribute money, materials, and time to a specific organization in the
community. Let i index households, j index community organizations, and k
index communities. We specify a two-equation model below
Y ijk ¼b1 þ b2Hi þ b3Vk þ b4Oj þ eijk ð5:1Þ
Zijk ¼b1 þ b2Hi þ b3Vk þ b4Oj þ vijk ð5:2Þ




is the ‘‘latent variable’’ measuring the net expected utility to
household i, from contributing money (time) to organization j in community
k, Hi represents a vector of household characteristics including head’s age,
sex, marital status, religion, years of schooling, household size, number of
children in the household, per capita household expenditure, household’s
receipt status from community organizations, household’s non-majority
status, and the share of household’s ethnic group with benefits; Vk is a vector
of community characteristics including ethno-linguistic diversity index of the
community and transfers from central government. Oj is a dummy for
organization j, and eijk ðvijkÞ is the error term. We assume that
E½e ¼ E½v ¼ 0; Var½e ¼ Var½v ¼ 1; Cov½e; v ¼ q: Since households contribute
towards the production of community services, it is reasonable to assume that
the disturbances in the money and time equations include common factors.




but only the choice
made by the household, which takes value 1 if household contributes money
(time) to the community organization (i.e. Y ijk is positive), and 0 otherwise.
P 1ijk ¼1 if Y ijk > 0; 0 otherwise
P 2ijk ¼1 if Zijk > 0; 0 otherwise
ð5:3Þ
We first analyze the probability of giving to any community organization.
Since there are ten community organizations in our sample, we construct:
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P 1ik ¼1 if
X10
j¼1
P 1ijk > 0; 0 otherwise
P 2ik ¼1 if
X10
j¼1
P 2ijk > 0; 0 otherwise
ð5:4Þ
We then estimate a bivariate probit specification where the dependent
variables are P 1ik and P
2
ik . Our specification includes a rich set of household and
community characteristics as explanatory variables. We refer to these
estimations where we analyze the probability of giving to any community
organization as our general regressions.
Our data set contains information on the amount transferred to com-
munity organizations, but it is important to recognize that money (time)




: Economic theory suggests that
the consumer makes a marginal benefit-marginal cost calculation when





ence between marginal benefits and marginal costs. With this caveat in mind,
we estimate a bivariate tobit model with the total amount of money and time
transferred to community organizations as the dependent variables.
Next, we estimate a bivariate probit specification where the dependent
variables are P 1ijk and P
2
ijk ; the probabilities that a household contributes
money and time to a specific community organization. By arranging the data
in this format, we are able to further investigate the robustness of our general
regressions. We refer to this analysis as our organization-specific regressions.
It may be difficult to fully capture all the community variables that affect
monetary and time contributions. Village characteristics such as civic tradi-
tions, quality of leadership, and the costs of producing services, which may be
unobserved, can also affect transfer patterns. Unobserved variables may be
correlated with measured community characteristics, leading to bias in our
estimated coefficients. The direction of the bias will depend on the correlation
between the observed and omitted variables, as well as the true impact of
observed variables on contributions. As a specification check, in our empirical
analysis, we deal with unobserved heterogeneity by adopting a community
random-effects probit model.
5.2. Existence of community organizations
Our theoretical framework suggests that in the presence of high transaction
costs and diverse preferences, an organization is unlikely to be formed in a
village. The empirical specification below allows us to analyze the determi-
nants of a given organization’s existence in a community:
Djk ¼ c1 þ c2Vk þ c3Oj þ uk þ ejk ð5:5Þ
where
Djk ¼ 1 if organization j exists in community k
¼ 0 otherwise
ð5:6Þ
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where Vk captures community characteristics that affect the demand for
community organizations, including transfers from the central government
and ethnic diversity index, Oj denotes a dummy variable for organization j, uk
is the community specific error term, and ejk is the random error term. We
estimate Eq. 5.5 using a probit model with community random effects.
Because the government may seek to achieve equity goals in the distri-
bution of resources across communities, central government transfers may
particularly target communities with low levels of community production in
which case our estimates of the effect of government involvement will be
biased downward (Pitt et al. 1993). To deal with the potential endogeneity of
government transfers, we adopt a two stage least squares specification where
we instrument for government transfers per capita with the instruments in our
analysis of the prevalence of community organizations. We instrument for
government transfers using two variables: the incidence of mass immuniza-
tion in the community since 1980 (immunize=1) and the community elec-
tricity index (which measures the years of electricity supply in the village).
6. Results
First, we present results which capture the probability that a household
contributes to at least one organization, as a function of household and
community characteristics in Sect. 6.1. Second, we analyze the determinants
of the total amount contributed to community organizations using a bivariate
tobit model. In Sects. 6.2 and 6.3, we examine the household’s decision to
contribute and the factors influencing the prevalence of community organi-
zations by organization type.
6.1. General regressions
6.1.1. The decision to contribute money and materials to community
organizations
Table 2 presents reduced-form results from a bivariate probit specification.
The bivariate model allows us to study the effects of household and
community variables on the joint decision to send monetary and/or time
transfers. The dependent variable is equal to one if a household contributes
money or materials (time) to at least one organization in the community, and
zero otherwise. We note that at the aggregate level that there is less variation
in the time contribution decision, as about 80% of households report positive
time contributions. Columns 1 and 2 present the marginal effects for
monetary and time contributions, respectively.12
From our results, a picture of the household-level determinants of con-
tributions emerges. Higher income households (measured by per capita
expenditure) are more likely to contribute to community organizations.
However, in contrast to studies from developed countries, a household’s
economic position has a relatively small impact on the probability of giving.
Starting from the mean, a ten percent increase in household’s per capita
expenditure in rupiah increases the probability of giving money (time) by
about 0.7(0.1)%.13 Educational attainment is positively associated with the
incidence of monetary transfers to the community organization and statisti-
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cally significant, while it is insignificant for time transfers. Male headship and
household size are positively and significantly associated with both monetary
and time contributions. The presence of young children (under 14) in the
household has a negative and statistically significant impact on the probability
of contributing money and time to a community organization. We also find
that urban households are significantly more likely to contribute money while
urban residence does not affect the probability of time transfers. Age does not
have a statistically significant effect on the incidence of monetary contribu-
tions, while age squared has a negative and significant effect on time transfers.
We find that the household’s receipt of benefits from the community
organization has a positive and statistically significant impact on giving. We
argue that this result provides support for an exchange-based model of
transfer behavior, with households contributing when they receive benefits
from the community organization. This effect is substantial – a change in a
household’s receipt status (as reported by the household) increases the
probability of giving money (time) by about 34% (23%).
How does ethnic diversity affect monetary contributions? Consistent with
our theoretical predictions, the ethnic diversity index has a negative and
statistically significant effect on the probability of contributing money. A
move from complete ethnic homogeneity to complete heterogeneity in a
community, (which represents an increase from 0 to 1 in the ethnic diversity
index) decreases the probability of giving by 12 percentage points. We find the
results on ethnic diversity to be sizeable, when compared to other significant
determinants of contributions. Starting at the mean, a ten percent increase in
the ethnic diversity index decreases the probability of giving by about 0.5
percentage points.14 The results presented above suggest that households
have a lower probability of contributing to community organizations within
ethnically diverse environments. However, the negative effect of ethnic
diversity on monetary contributions may be explained by the high transaction
costs of community level production as well as the diverse preferences for
public goods in heterogeneous communities. It may not be possible to fully
disentangle these two potential explanations in our data. However, to further
differentiate between these two motives, we also include a variable that is
equal to one if household belongs to a non-majority ethno-linguistic group in
a community where there is a dominant ethnic group. This variable captures
the diverse preference argument since our indicator variable is equal to one
when the household is different than the median voter who is from the
majority ethnic group. We find the non-majority variable to have a negative
but insignificant impact on monetary contributions. Interestingly, the non-
majority dummy is negative and statistically significant for time transfers. We
also note that the ethnic diversity index is negative, but statistically insig-
nificant for time transfers. This suggests that the preference heterogeneity
may be a more important explanation for the negative effect of ethnic
diversity on time contributions.
Theory also suggests that ethnic diversity can affect contributions through
inter-household considerations. We examine closely the impact of the share of
beneficiaries from household’s ethnic group (SHARE) on contributions but
find that the SHARE variable does not significantly affect monetary contri-
butions. However, this variable has a positive and statistically significant (at
the 10% level) effect on the incidence of time transfers. Starting at the mean, a
ten percent increase in this variable leads to a 0.2 percentage point increase in
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the probability that a household will contribute time to a community orga-
nization. Hence, we find some evidence for the altruism motive in the decision
to contribute time to the community organization.
All our empirical specifications discussed above include province dummies
to capture regional economic and environmental factors, as well as pre-
existing traditions of community organization. Province dummies also control
for some of the variation in attitudes towards giving across communities.15
We now turn to discuss other community characteristics that can affect the
probability of giving. Results on the effect of government transfers provide
some direction towards understanding the role of the public expenditure in
low-income settings.16 From our results, the probability that a household
contributes money or time to community organizations is negatively and
significantly associated with transfers per capita from the central government.
This lends support to a crowding-out model of government spending. Starting
from the mean, a ten percent increase in government spending per capita
decreases the probability of giving money (time) by 0.7 (0.1) percentage
points. Hence, the effect of government spending is smaller for time transfers
as expected. To further demonstrate the impact of government spending, an
increase from the minimum to maximum value of government spending per
capita in our sample reduces the probability of monetary transfers by 19
percentage points.17
One might argue that ethnic diversity reflects other types of heterogeneity
such as income inequality within a community. The existing literature sug-
gests that income or wealth inequality can affect incentives to contribute to
the community organization (LaFerrara 2001). To rule out this interpretation
of our results, we control for income heterogeneity at the community-level
using the Gini coefficient index.18 We find that income inequality is negatively
and significantly associated with the probability of giving money and mate-
rials but has an insignificant effect on the probability of making time
transfers.
Community resources affect household preferences, as well as the nature
of services provided by the community organization, and therefore may
influence the household’s decision to contribute. We find that average com-
munity income is positively associated with monetary contributions and
statistically significant, while it is insignificant for time transfers. In particular,
a 10% increase in average community expenditure increases the likelihood of
monetary contributions by about 1.3 percentage points. We should note that
both household income and community level income as well as income
inequality within the community appear much more important for the inci-
dence of money contributions. Log population has a positive but insignificant
impact on both types of transfers.
We also find that the density of community activities has a positive and
statistically significant effect on time contributions, although it is not signif-
icant for monetary contributions. This result is not surprising since the
presence of complementary inputs may be of greater relevance for time
contributions.
Community random-effects. We now discuss results on monetary and time
contributions based on the community random-effects specification.19 The
random-effects model allows us to deal with unobserved heterogeneity at the
community level. In this specification, the signs and significance of ethnicity
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variables remain comparable to our bivariate estimates. This specification
serves as a robustness check and strengthens our confidence in the results
presented above. The impact of government transfers remains negative and
significant for time transfers, but becomes less statistically significant for
monetary contributions (significant at the 15% level) with community
random-effects.
6.1.2. Determinants of transfer amounts
In Table 2 (columns 3 and 4), we also present results based on a bivariate
tobit model where dependent variables are the natural logarithm of the
household’s total monetary transfers (in rupiah) and total time contributions
(in hours) to community organizations, respectively.20 Our results on
household and community variables appear comparable to earlier results
shown in columns 1 and 2.
We discuss the coefficients on ethnicity and community specific variables
in detail. The ethnic diversity index has a large negative and significant impact
on both monetary and time transfers. As presented above, a household’s non-
majority status has a negative and significant effect on the level of time
transfers, (while it is negative, but insignificant for money transfers). The
share of beneficiaries from household’s ethnic group is statistically insignifi-
cant for both types of transfers. Government per-capita transfers to the
community has a negative and significant effect on both monetary and time
contributions. We find that a 1 rupiah increase in per-capita transfers to
community decreases per-capita private transfers by 0.49 rupiah.21 The index
of community activity has a positive and significant effect on time contribu-
tions while it is positive, but significant for monetary transfers. We find that
income inequality has a negative and significant effect on monetary contri-
butions, while its effect is insignificant for time transfers. Average community
expenditure has a positive effect on monetary transfers, while it is shown to
have a negative and significant effect on time transfers. Our results on the
negative impact of community resources on the level of time transfers may
indicate the presence of higher opportunity costs of time contributions within
higher income communities.
6.2. Contributions to specific community organizations
In this section, we examine the probability that a household contributes to a
specific community organization using a bivariate probit specification. Our
goal here is to analyze the determinants of contributions to a specific
organization given that this organization exists in the community.22 Since
we have multiple observations for each household, we construct the
dependent variable such that it is equal to 1 if a household in a given
community contributes to a specific type of organization, and 0 otherwise.
This enables us to exploit the detailed information on contribution patterns
available in the data. Household and community variables are the same
measures used in the general framework, and all estimations include
province dummies. In addition, we introduce controls for organization
characteristics (by including a dummy variable for each organization type in
our sample). There are ten types of community organizations in our sample.
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Table 3 is based on a bivariate probit specification for monetary and time
contributions. The results on household variables are very similar to our
general regressions. For example, starting at the mean, a ten percent increase
in the per capita household expenditure increases the probability of giving
money (time) by about 0.8 (0.1) percentage points. We closely examine how
ethnicity-and community-specific variables affect contributions.
According to our results, the ethnic diversity index remains negatively
and significantly associated with monetary contributions. Ethnic diversity
also has a negative and statistically significant effect on time contributions.
Starting at the mean, a 10% increase in the ethnic diversity index decreases
the probability of giving money (time) by about 0.6 (0.3) percentage points.
However, for time contributions, the significance of this variable appears
sensitive to the inclusion of other ethnicity variables in our organization-
Table 3. Determinants of monetary and time contributions to community organizations (IFLS2)








Head’s age )0.0005 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001)
Head’s age squared (X 100) 0.0001 (0.001) )0.01 (0.001)
Sex (Male = 1) 0.02 (0.01) 0.10 (0.01)
Head’s years of schooling 0.002 (0.0004) 0.003 (0.001)
Head’s marital status (married = 1) 0.005 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)
Muslim (= 1) 0.004 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01)
Household size 0.01 (0.001) 0.02 (0.001)
Number of children < 14years )0.01 (0.00) )0.02 (0.00)
Per capita HH exp in Rupiah (X 106) 0.03 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Urban(= 1) 0.02 (0.004) 0.004 (0.007)
Received benefit from community
organization?
0.08 (0.003) 0.19 (0.005)
Share of beneficiaries )0.001 (0.002) )0.01 (0.004)
from ethnic group
Non-majority household (=1) )0.002 (0.001) 0.0002 (0.001)
Community variables
Log population 0.04 (0.00) )0.01 (0.00)
Government spending (per capita) )0.16 (0.03) )0.05 (0.06)
Average expenditure (in Rupiah)
(X 106)
0.04 (0.02) )0.015 (0.028)
Gini coefficient )0.02 (0.01) )0.03 (0.01)
Index of community activity )0.001 (0.01) )0.01 (0.01)
Ethnic diversity index )0.003 (0.005) )0.06 (0.008)
Organization dummies YES YES
Number of observations 35949
Log likelihood )26513.73
rho 0.54
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*, **, *** Denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
All regressions include province dummies. In addition, we restrict our sample to communities
where population>10.
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specific estimates. For example, when share of beneficiaries from house-
hold’s ethnic group (SHARE) is excluded from the regression, ethnic
diversity is no longer significant for time. Similar to our earlier results from
the general bivariate specification, non-majority status has a negative and
significant effect on the incidence of time transfers, while its effect is
insignificant for monetary transfers. SHARE is no longer significant for
time contributions, and it remains insignificant for money transfers. We
should note that SHARE was significant only at 10% for time in the general
bivariate probit specification.
To summarize, ethnic diversity has a negative and significant effect on the
incidence of monetary contributions, while non-majority status has a negative
and significant effect on the incidence of time transfers. A change in a
household’s status (from non-majority to majority) increases the probability
of giving time by about 6%. Both of these results appear robust across both
general and organization-specific specifications.
The effect of government transfers on contributions deserves close
attention. The effect of government transfers on money contributions re-
mains negative and significant in the organization-specific regression.
Starting at the mean, a ten percent increase in the government expenditures
per capita decreases the probability of giving money by about 0.9 per-
centage points. However, this variable is no longer significant for the inci-
dence of time transfers. We should note that government transfers had a
relatively small effect on time transfers in the general bivariate probit
specification. Our results on average village income and income inequality
and the density of community activities remain similar to those from the
general regressions.
Our results (not shown) remain robust to the inclusion of household
random effects.23 As noted above, ethnic diversity is found to have a neg-
ative and significant effect on the incidence of monetary transfers while
household’s non-majority status has a negative and significant effect for time
transfers. We find evidence that government transfers may crowd out
monetary transfers while they are insignificant for time transfers. However,
when we adopt a community random effects specification, we note a
reduction in levels of significance for community level variables including
ethnic diversity index and government transfers. Non-majority status re-
mains negative and significant for time transfers. We argue that community
random effects are magnified due to the way our data are arranged in
organization regressions, and as a result, the significance levels of commu-
nity level variables are reduced.
In summary, results from our organization-specific analysis confirm
theoretical predictions. Ethnic diversity appears to have a negative impact on
both monetary and time contributions, although it may affect contributions
through different channels. In particular, ethnic diversity at the community-
level has a negative effect on the probability of monetary contributions, while
households are less likely to contribute time if they belong to a non-majority
group. These results imply that the higher transaction costs within an eth-
nically diverse community may be more important in lowering the likelihood
and level of monetary transfers while diverse preferences might be more rel-
evant for time transfers. Another potential explanation is that non-majority
households derive a disutility from interacting with the members of the
majority ethnic group as hypothesized by Alesina and LaFerrara (2000). We
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do not find a robust effect of altruism towards one’s own ethnic group on
contributions.
6.3. Existence of community organizations
Table 4 presents results on the prevalence of community organizations at the
community-level. Our theoretical framework suggests that ethnic diversity
may also affect the existence of community organizations through high
transaction costs and diverse preferences within a community. We construct a
measure of prevalence of community organizations from households’ reports
on whether or not a specific organization exists in the community. Our
regressions are estimated at the community-level.
In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the mean household report
on the existence of organizations at the community level. Column 3 shows
results from a probit specification, with occurrence as a dichotomous variable
which is equal to 1 if community organization exists and zero, otherwise. We
exploit the fact that we have multiple observations on each community, and
we adopt a community random effects specification. Regressions in this sec-
tion are estimated at the community level.
From our results, ethnic diversity index does have a negative and sta-
tistically significant effect on the prevalence of organizations. This negative
result persists across all specifications (columns 1–3). From column 3, a
10% increase in ethnic diversity decreases the probability of occurrence of










)0.04 (0.02) )0.12 (0.06) )0.08 )0.30 (0.17)
Average expenditure
in Rupiah (X 106)
0.09 (0.04) 0.03 (0.07) 0.16 0.58 (0.42)
Government spending
(per capita)
)0.004 (0.002) )0.04 (0.03) )0.005 )0.02 (0.02)
Average years of
schooling
0.001 (0.002) 0.005 (0.003) )0.001 )0.002 (0.02)
Gini coefficient )0.14 (0.09) )0.002 (0.16) 0.43 1.67 (0.83)
Community random-effects Yes Yes Yes
Organization dummies Yes Yes Yes




Wald chi2-Statistic = 635.12
The dependent variable (occur) is based on community means of households’ reports of
organizational existence (see Appendix A for a list of organizations). Marginal Effects are
calculated at the mean Standard errors are shown in parentheses. All regressions include province
dummies. We restrict our sample to IFLS communities where village population>10 & denotes
significance at the 11 % level
* Denotes significance at the 10 % level, ** at the 5 % level, and *** at the 1 % level.
Results also includes controls for log population and urbanization. Constant term is not shown.
In the IV specification (column 2), we instrument for government spending. Estimates are
provided at the community level. There are 314 communities in our sample.
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an organization by 0.2%. The robustness of this result may appear sur-
prising, given that others (notably, Weisbrod 1988) have argued that ethnic
diversity may exert a positive influence on the existence of community
organizations. In Weisbrod’s view, community organizations supply public
goods in heterogenous communities as a response to market and state
failure. However, the prevalence of community organizations may also
depend on the emergence of organization leaders or ‘‘social entrepreneurs’’
(James 1987), who create community organizations to meet the diverse
needs of ethnic, religious, and income groups in the community. We note
that within more restrictive political environments, particularly with less
democratic governance, the incentives for, and the scope of community-level
activity, may be reduced.
Other community-specific variables appear to have a less robust effect on
the prevalence of community organizations. Government involvement in the
community (government transfers per capita) has a negative but statistically
insignificant effect on the prevalence of a given organization. As government
programsmay not be randomly allocated across communities in Indonesia and
central government spendingmay have redistributive objectives, we instrument
for government transfers using two variables: the incidence of mass immuni-
zation in the community since 1980 (immunize=1) and the village electricity
index (which measures the years of electricity supply in the village). When we
instrument for government transfers, the coefficient on government spending
remains negative, although only statistically significant at the 11% level (col-
umn 2). Average community expenditure (per capita) and average years of
education are positively associated with the prevalence of community orga-
nizations.
7. Conclusions
Beyond providing local public goods and services, community organizations
may be linked to social capital formation and economic growth (Putnam 1993;
Knack and Keefer 1997). Using data from Indonesia, we find that ethnic
diversity has a negative effect on both monetary and time contributions as well
as on the prevalence of community-based organizations. Our main findings are
suggestive of mechanisms through which ethnic diversity can influence
contributions. For monetary contributions, transaction costs emerge as an
important explanation for the negative effect of ethnic diversity. However,
preference heterogeneity, as well as transaction costs of organizing community
activity, may explain the negative impact of ethnic diversity on time
contributions.
The results from this study can inform public policy towards community
organizations in developing countries. While decentralization and segregation
along ethnic boundaries may reduce the costs of organizing community activity
in the short run, such policies may prove costly in the long run if they lead to
further ethnic polarization (Benabou 1996). Thus, government policies that
provide incentives for cooperation across ethnic and cultural boundaries may
prove beneficial over a long term horizon. One noteworthy success of the early
political leadership in Indonesia was the development of a national language
policy with the adoption of Bahasa Indonesia as the official language.24
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Regarding the effect of central government transfers, we find support for a
crowding-out model for monetary contributions, with less convincing evi-
dence on time contributions. However, we should note that the crowding out
effects of central government transfers on monetary contributions tend to be
relatively small. Further research may be needed to investigate what role
governments can play in supporting community institutions across various
settings.
Appendix
Table A1. Contribution to community organizations by type
Type of
organization






































































N = 7510 households.
Table A2. Benefits received from community organizations (by class of benefits received)
Class of benefit received Mean
Did HH receive any class of benefits? 0.58
(1=Yes, 0=No)
1. Received service from organization 0.13
2. Received materials 0.02
3. Received money 0.08
4. Received other 0.11
5. Received information 0.31
6. Received infrastructure 0.34
N=7510.
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Endnotes
1 A growing number of studies examine the link between ethnic diversity and economic
outcomes (Alesina et al. 1999; Alesina and LaFerrara 2001; Collier 2000; Easterly and Levine
1997; Miguel 2001).
2 To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine crowding-out issues for transfers to
community organizations in a developing country context using household-level data. Wong
et al. (1998) use organization-level data from Singapore to study transfers to community
organizations. The authors find some evidence that government transfers crowd out private
contributions.
3 The government has also been involved in relocating families through its Transmigration
Program from the highly populated islands of Java, Bali, and Madura to less populated
islands. Between 1969 to 1989, some 730,000 families were relocated under the Transmigration
program.
4 This hypothesis may be less appropriate for Indonesia, which had a centrally-administered
government during our period of study, with very limited public involvement in central
government spending decisions. Diverse preferences may lead to a wide range of opinions on
what type of public goods to provide, and within democratic systems of government, the
supply of public goods reflect the preferences of the median voter only Weisbrod (1988:27).
5 We acknowledge the contributions of an anonymous referee in suggesting this variable.
6 This result is unambiguous in the case when there is only one type of transfer. When the
household considers both money and time transfers, we need a restriction on the cross-utility
effects as specified in the discussion of diverse preferences.
7 In our study, the term community refers to an IFLS enumeration area. An enumeration area
refers a cluster of households located in an administrative area called desa (village) or
keluruhan (township).
8 Alesina and LaFarrera (2000) and LaFarrera (2001) examine participation in social and
religious groups. Although these may be of considerable importance in our sample, the IFLS
data do not provide information on religious and social contributions.
9 It would also be interesting to study the effect of religious heterogeneity on contributions.
However, a majority (about 88%) of the IFLS sample can be identified as Muslim.
10 We check the reliability of our household-based measure of ethnic diversity against limited
data on ethnic composition available in the Community survey. The community-based
ethnicity variable is highly and statistically significantly correlated with our household-based
measure (correlation coefficient=0.67). This community-based measure of ethnicity relies on
information obtained from village leaders on the population share of the three largest ethnic
groups in the community.
11 There are 16 community activities listed in the Community-Facility Survey. If an activity is
conducted regularly it is weighted by 2, if it is conducted irregularly it is weighted by 1, and if it
is never conducted it is weighted by 0. In addition to the eight organizations detailed in the
household survey (organizations A through H in Table 2), eight additional community
activities, namely youth groups, study groups, village library, public works, adult literacy
program, waste water management system, underdeveloped village program, village decision
making organization are used to construct this measure.
12 Marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means for continuous variables, and reflect a
change from 0 to 1 for discrete variables.
13 For all variables, point elasticities evaluated at the means are available upon request.
14 We also investigate an additional specification which includes ethnic squared as a regressor.
Our ethnic diversity index remains negative and significant, however, ethnic square is positive
and significant suggesting a non-linear relationship between ethnicity and contributions.
15 As noted by an anonymous referee, cultural differences in patterns of giving are likely to be
important. For example, the Javanese and Sundanese are significantly more likely to give than
other ethnic groups. Both of the above ethnic groups had highly centralized pre-colonial
systems of organizing community life that bore similarities to the gotong royong system of
community organization in post-independence Indonesia.
16 As discussed earlier, local government expenditure in Indonesia depends heavily on transfers
from the center. There are two main types of central government transfers: (i) Block grants
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(INPRES)-which fund specific development expenditures on roads, primary schools, public
health centers and reforestation (ii) transfers for local government personnel expenses.
17 The maximum level of central government spending in our sample is 19132 rupiah per capita,
while the minimum level is 82 rupiah per capita.
18 Our Gini coefficient index was constructed using expenditure data at the kecamatan (district)
level.
19 These results are not shown, but are available upon request from the authors. These
estimations are carried out as univariate probit specifications. We should note that coefficients
from the random effects specification are unbiased only if regressors are orthogonal to the
error term, including the community effect.
20 The dependent variables here are measured as the natural logarithm of (monetary transfers
+1) and the natural logarithm of (time transfers +1) respectively.
21 This result is calculated based a univariate Tobit model where (log) money transfers is the
dependent variable. In this regression, the coefficient on the government transfers is found to
be -0.12 and significant. We multiply this coefficient by average per capita money transfers,
which gives us our crowding out estimate.
22 Our data on organizational existence is based on the household survey. Thus, we assume that
if at least one household head in a community is aware of an organization’s existence, then this
organization exists in this community during the survey period.
23 Since we have multiple observations for each household, we are able to adopt a random
household effect specification in our organization-specific regressions.
24 In addition, the structure of community institutions may need to differ across regions in order
to account for diverse preferences of members within heterogeneous communities. For
example, power-sharing arrangements among ethnic groups may reduce ethnic-based
polarization.
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